Educational ranges, not legal advice This modeler turns verified statutory parameters into low/high exposure ranges for training, prioritization, and budgeting conversations. It is not legal advice and not a damages opinion — actual exposure turns on the facts as found, available defenses, tolling, offsets, and (for class and representative claims) certification. See the disclaimer.

A $30-per-week overtime error prices out very differently in Boston, Sacramento, and Albany. This tool takes one alleged pattern — how many workers, how long, how much per week — and runs it through the chosen jurisdiction's full statutory stack: limitations window, the damages multiplier or penalty meter, and the derivative penalties (California's §203/§226/PAGA pile, New York's WTPA meters and pay-frequency rules) that often dwarf the underlying wages. Sixteen regimes are modeled; every line carries its citation; inputs never leave your browser.

Five damages architectures, not one#

"Liquidated damages" is shorthand for at least five structurally different machines, and the difference decides the case long before the hourly shortfall does. The model sorts every regime into one of them, because the architecture — not the multiplier alone — governs both the ceiling and whether the employer has any escape:

  1. FLSA-style doubling with a good-faith escape. Back wages plus an equal amount as liquidated damages (1× on top, 2× total), which a court may reduce or deny on a documented good-faith, reasonable-grounds showing. The federal FLSA, Florida's minimum-wage act, Washington's exemplary-damages rule, and Connecticut's post-2015 double-damages default all run on this chassis — but the burden and the floor differ (Connecticut puts the burden on the employer; D.C. floors the reduction at 1× and never reaches zero).
  2. Enhanced multipliers with little or no escape. New Jersey's 200%-on-top (3× total), Maryland's discretionary treble, Arizona's mandatory Prop 206 treble, Illinois's mandatory Minimum-Wage-Law treble, and Massachusetts's mandatory treble with no good-faith defense at all. Here the low end and the high end converge — Massachusetts and Arizona price low-equals-high — and the only real lever is paying correctly and on time.
  3. Penalty-wage and accruing meters. Oregon's penalty wages (eight hours' pay per day for up to 30 days, capped at 100% of the unpaid wages) and Illinois's 5%-per-month meter (60% of the underpayment per year, every year until paid) are not multipliers at all — they price delay. The longer the wages sit unpaid, the larger the number, which inverts the usual litigation incentive to run out the clock.
  4. Demand-triggered liquidated damages. Colorado (the greater of 2× wages or $1,000 per employee, 3× or $3,000 if willful) and Pennsylvania (the greater of 25% of wages or $500) attach only after a written demand or a payday passes unpaid — and a timely tender or a good-faith contest forecloses them. The clock the employer controls is short (14 days in Colorado), so intake speed is the whole game.
  5. Derivative-penalty stacks. California (§203 waiting time, §226 wage statements, §226.7 premiums, and post-reform PAGA) and New York (the WTPA $50/$250-per-day meters and the §191 pay-frequency rule) bolt per-period and per-day penalties onto the wage claim that routinely dwarf it — the wage shortfall is the trigger, not the bulk of the exposure.

Prejudgment interest then rides on top where the state allows it, and where it does the base matters: Massachusetts runs 12% but, after George v. National Water Main Cleaning Co. (2017), only on the actual lost wages — never on the trebled portion. The model applies interest to the un-trebled base for exactly that reason.

Sixteen regimes. For the state models, parallel FLSA claims usually ride along — the result flags that.
Headcount exposed to the same alleged practice.
How long the pattern has run — the limitations window trims it automatically.
Drives per-pay-period penalties (CA §226 and PAGA — weekly payroll halves PAGA's per-period rate).
Former employees whose final pay was short — feeds §203 waiting-time penalties.
Used for waiting time. Left blank, the tool derives 8 hours × the regular rate entered under meal/rest.
Theories alleged
Regular-rate errors, off-the-clock time, misclassification.
Sub-minimum hours, invalid tip credits, unreimbursed costs.
§226.7 premium pay — one hour per type per day.
Tips kept by the house or shared with managers; undistributed service charges.
CA §226(e) per-period penalties; NY WTPA $250-per-workday statement penalties.
Posture & defenses
Bus. & Prof. Code §17208 extends wage restitution to four years.
Sets the low end of liquidated damages to zero where the statute allows it. Massachusetts allows no such defense; D.C. floors it at 1×.
PAGA mitigation posture (CA) Lab. Code §2699 post-reform tiers (AB 2288/SB 92). The $25 tier applies to §226 wage-statement violations the employee could promptly and easily decode from the statement itself.

Four look-back windows, four very different cases#

The first number that matters in any wage-hour matter is not the hourly shortfall — it is how many weeks of it are legally reachable. The same payroll mistake supports a 104-week claim in federal court, a 312-week claim in New York, and a mandatory-treble claim in Massachusetts:

JurisdictionLook-backOn top of back wagesGood-faith out?
Federal FLSA 2 years; 3 if willful (29 U.S.C. §255(a)) Liquidated damages equal to the back wages (29 U.S.C. §216(b)) Yes — 29 U.S.C. §260
California 3 years (CCP §338(a)); 4 via UCL restitution (Bus. & Prof. Code §17208) Liquidated damages on minimum wages only (Lab. Code §1194.2) — but §226.7 premiums, §203 waiting time, §226(e) statements, and PAGA stack on top Yes, for §1194.2
New York 6 years (Lab. Law §198(3)) 100% liquidated damages on all wage claims (§198(1-a)), plus 9% CPLR prejudgment interest and the WTPA paperwork penalties Yes — §198(1-a)
Massachusetts 3 years (M.G.L. c.149 §150) Mandatory treble damages — 3× the wages, no discretion (Reuter v. City of Methuen, 2022) No

How the California stack compounds#

50 housekeepers, $30 per week of overtime underpayment, running three years. Biweekly payroll, $25 regular rate, one missed meal period per housekeeper per week. The stack:

  • Back overtime wages: $234,000 — $30 × 156 weeks × 50 employees (CCP §338(a) three-year window).
  • Liquidated damages: $0 on this theory — Lab. Code §1194.2 reaches minimum wages only, not overtime. The doubling, if any, comes from the parallel FLSA claim.
  • Meal premiums: $195,000 — 1 × $25 × 156 × 50. Premiums are wages under Naranjo v. Spectrum, so they get the full three-year (or four-year UCL) window, not a one-year penalty period.
  • §226 wage statements: $127,500 — only 26 biweekly periods fit the one-year penalty window: $50 + $100 × 25 = $2,550 per employee. On weekly payroll the math runs to $5,150 and the $4,000-per-employee cap binds, so the line becomes $200,000.
  • PAGA: $130,000 at full freight — or $19,500. $100 × 50 employees × 26 pay periods in the one-year PAGA window. An employer that documented "all reasonable steps" before the PAGA notice is capped at 15% ($19,500); steps within 60 days after cap it at 30% ($39,000). The reform cap alone is a $110,500 swing on these facts.

Bottom line: roughly $686,500 for the employer with no compliance record versus $576,000 for the one with documented audits, training, and corrective action — before fees, and before a UCL claim stretches the wage lines to four years (the overtime line alone grows by $78,000).

New York: six years deep, with a 2025 pay-frequency reset#

New York's six-year look-back plus 100% liquidated damages effectively quadruples a federal two-year claim on the same facts, and CPLR prejudgment interest at 9% accrues on top. The WTPA paperwork meters run fast: $250 per workday for missing or inaccurate wage statements and $50 per workday for missing hiring notices, each capped at $5,000 per employee — a cap a full-time worker reaches in four weeks on the statement side.

The May 9, 2025 amendment to Labor Law §§191 and 198 defused the biggest hotel-industry exposure: frequency-of-pay claims by "manual workers" (housekeepers, porters, bell staff) paid biweekly instead of weekly. For a first violation where wages were paid in full on regular semi-monthly-or-better paydays, damages are now lost interest only, at the 16% rate the Department of Financial Services sets under Banking Law §14-a — not 100% liquidated damages on every late-paid dollar. Repeat violations after a prior finding or order still carry full liquidated damages, which is why the model prices the two postures separately.

Massachusetts: mandatory treble, no cure, interest on the base#

Under M.G.L. c.149 §150 as read by Reuter v. City of Methuen (2022), treble damages are mandatory — even for wages paid late but before suit. There is no good-faith reduction and no cure by catching up payroll; the only safe harbor is paying wages, final pay, and earned tips and service charges when due. Attorneys' fees are a mandatory addition for a prevailing employee, and the procedural path runs through the Attorney General first (suit may follow 90 days later, or sooner with AG assent). The model prices Massachusetts with low equal to high for exactly this reason — then adds 12% statutory prejudgment interest under G.L. c.231 §6H. After George v. National Water Main Cleaning Co., 477 Mass. 371 (2017), that interest runs only on the actual lost wages, not on the trebled (liquidated-damages) portion, so on a $234,000 wage base over three years the interest line is roughly $42,000 — not three times that.

A worked Florida example#

30 housekeepers, $40 per week of minimum-wage shortfall, running four years. Florida has no state overtime law, so this is a pure §448.110 minimum-wage claim; biweekly payroll. The stack:

  • Back minimum wages: $249,600 — $40 × 208 weeks (the four-year §95.11(3) window) × 30 employees.
  • Liquidated damages: $249,600 — an equal amount on top (§448.110(7)(c)), unless the employer makes a good-faith, reasonable-grounds showing, which drops this line toward zero. High end ≈ $499,200; the good-faith low end is the back wages alone.
  • The 15-day cure that resets it all. Before any of this, Florida requires the employee to send written notice of the claim; paying the noticed amount within 15 calendar days resolves it before liquidated damages and the one-way fee award ever attach. A willful violation stretches the window to five years (§95.11(2)(d)), pushing the back-wage line to $312,000.

The lesson Florida teaches in miniature: the cheapest dollar in wage-hour exposure is the one paid inside the statutory cure window, before the multiplier and the fee-shift switch on.

The rest of the menu, by architecture#

FLSA-style doubling (good-faith escape):

  • Washington — 3-year look-back (RCW 4.16.080(3)); a willful withholding doubles the judgment to twice the wages as exemplary damages, with fees (RCW 49.52.050(2), .070; RCW 49.48.030). A documented bona fide dispute defeats willfulness (Schilling v. Radio Holdings, 1998).
  • Connecticut — double damages are the default after the 2015 amendment (C.G.S. §31-72, P.A. 15-86): twice the wages unless the employer carries its burden of proving a good-faith belief that the pay complied with the law. Two-year window (§52-596); fees in either case.
  • Florida — minimum-wage only (Art. X §24 Fla. Const.; §448.110): back wages plus an equal amount, good-faith reduction available, 4-year / 5-year-willful window, and the §448.110(6) presuit notice with its 15-day cure.

Enhanced multipliers (little or no escape):

  • New Jersey — 6-year look-back and liquidated damages of up to 200% on top of the wages (3× total) under the 2019 Wage Theft Act (N.J.S.A. 34:11-56a25, -56a25.1; 34:11-4.10), with a narrow first-violation escape: inadvertent good-faith error, an admission, and payment within 30 days of notice.
  • Maryland — up to treble total under the Wage Payment and Collection Law (Lab. & Empl. §3-507.2), discretionary and unavailable where the withholding rested on a bona fide dispute, so the model spreads the range from the base wages to 3×. Three-year window (Cts. & Jud. Proc. §5-101).
  • Arizona — Proposition 206 (A.R.S. §23-364(G)) trebles a minimum-wage underpayment mandatorily (the balance plus twice more), with no good-faith escape; 2-year / 3-year-willful window. No state overtime law — overtime runs under the FLSA.
  • Illinois (Minimum Wage Law) — mandatory treble on minimum-wage and overtime claims (820 ILCS 105/12(a), P.A. 101-1), stacked on the 5%-per-month meter, on a 3-year window. This is the harder Illinois claim; the Wage Payment Act path below is broader but un-trebled.
  • District of Columbia — liquidated damages equal to treble the unpaid wages in addition to the wages — four times total — on a 3-year window; even a successful good-faith showing leaves at least 1× as the statutory floor (D.C. Code §§32-1308, 32-1012(b)).

Penalty-wage and accruing meters (delay is the theory):

  • Oregon — penalty wages of eight hours' pay per day for up to 30 days (ORS 652.150), carried into minimum-wage and overtime claims by ORS 653.055 and capped at 100% of the unpaid wages unless the employer fails to pay within 12 days of written notice. Willfulness is required, so a bona fide dispute or financial inability defeats it; 6-year wage window (ORS 652.230), fees under ORS 652.200.
  • Illinois (Wage Payment & Collection Act) — no multiplier, but damages of 5% of the underpayment per month until paid (820 ILCS 115/14(a), P.A. 102-50 raised it from 2% on July 9, 2021) on a 10-year civil window (735 ILCS 5/13-206). Enter an as-of date to blend the 2%/5% rate across the change.

Demand-triggered liquidated damages (a short clock the employer controls):

  • Colorado — miss the 14-day window after a written demand and the penalty is the greater of 2× the wages or $1,000 per employee; willful (including any repeat within 5 years, which is willful per se) raises it to the greater of 3× or $3,000 (C.R.S. 8-4-109(3), SB22-161). A full good-faith tender within 14 days eliminates it. Look-back 2 years, 3 if willful (C.R.S. 8-4-122).
  • Pennsylvania — WPCL liquidated damages of the greater of 25% of the wages due or $500 (43 P.S. §260.10), available only once wages are 30 days past the payday and only absent a good-faith contest of the claim. The Minimum Wage Act itself adds no multiplier, so the model prices the wages plus the §260.10 penalty; 3-year window.

Mitigation that actually moves the number#

  • The relaunched PAID program (federal). Back on July 24, 2025 for FLSA and FMLA violations: a supervised self-audit with back-wage payment and releases, no liquidated damages, and no civil money penalties. Eligibility is narrow — not available while under investigation or in litigation on the same violations, after the same violations were found within three years, or within three years of a prior PAID audit — and back wages are due within 15 days of the WHD summary.
  • PAGA cure and early evaluation (California). Employers under 100 employees can propose a cure through an LWDA conference; larger employers can request a court early-evaluation conference and a stay.
  • Documented "all reasonable steps" (California). Payroll audits with corrective action, lawful written policies, supervisor training, and discipline — taken before a PAGA notice — cap penalties at 15%; within 60 days after, 30%. The paper trail is the cap.
  • Pay premiums currently (California). Because §226.7 premiums are wages under Naranjo, paying them in the period earned and showing them on wage statements cuts the derivative §203 and §226 exposure.
  • Weekly pay for New York manual workers. Paying hotel service staff weekly (or obtaining NYSDOL authorization for semi-monthly pay) ends §191 frequency exposure prospectively — and accurate WTPA paperwork stops the per-day meters long before the caps. The 2025 interest-only floor for a first violation applies only where wages were in fact paid at least semi-monthly on regular paydays; a monthly cadence forfeits it, so the model lets you toggle that condition off.
  • The statutory cure windows. Several regimes hand the employer a short, decisive window to pay and foreclose the penalty entirely: Florida's 15-day presuit cure (§448.110(6)), Oregon's 12-day post-notice window (ORS 652.150), Colorado's 14-day tender (C.R.S. 8-4-109), and New Jersey's 30-day first-violation cure. The common denominator is intake speed — every one of these clocks starts when a demand letter arrives, so the same-week review process is worth more than any after-the-fact argument.

What this tool does not do#

  • It models one jurisdiction at a time. State and FLSA claims usually travel together; the result flags that, but it does not net overlapping recoveries.
  • The New York pay-frequency and prejudgment-interest figures are labeled approximations — the engine states each assumption in its step.
  • PAGA's four post-reform tiers ($100 default, $200 aggravated, $50 isolated with its capped window, $25 easily-determinable wage-statement) are computed from the tier you select — but whether a tier's factual predicate holds is exactly the kind of question the steps flag rather than decide.
  • Attorneys' fees — often the largest line in a real case — are never estimated from the law: fee awards turn on documented hours and a court-approved lodestar. The tool prices a fee line only when you supply your own assumption, and labels it as exactly that.
  • It prices one wage theory at the rate you enter; it does not decide which theories the facts support, whether a class would certify, or whether a tier's factual predicate (willfulness, a bona fide dispute, good faith) actually holds. Those are the questions the steps flag rather than answer.

Start from facts, not hypotheticals: run a real week through the workweek auditor, then price the pattern here. Background: PAGA & class actions · recordkeeping · overtime & the regular rate. This tool is educational and illustrative — see the disclaimer.